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Abstract: This paper focuses on the international transportation market in which a high-speed rail (HSR) 
firm competes with both the domestic and foreign airline firms providing differentiated transport 
services. We investigate and compare two types of corporate social responsibility (CSR)—mandatory 
and voluntary CSR—imposed on HSR under a government subsidy policy. We show that, when the 
transport substitutability is high (low) in a domestic travel leg, mandatory CSR is lower (higher) than 
voluntary CSR, and the optimal subsidy under mandatory CSR is lower (higher) than that under 
voluntary CSR. We also examine the effect of privatization policy of the HSR with transposition subsidy 
on welfare. We show that full privatization with CSR activities always improves social welfare under 
an appropriate subsidy, independent of the transport substitutability and types of CSR activities. 
Keywords: High-speed rail, corporate social responsibility, transportation subsidy, privatization policy, 
mixed market  
1. Introduction  
China's high-speed rail (HSR) dramatically developed in the last two decades. The first HSR in 
China officially began operation in 2008, and China’s HSR mileage has ranked first in the world since 
2012. As the four north-south and four east-west corridors of the HSR network had almost been 
completed, the government proposed the eight north-south and eight east-west corridors project in 2016. 
As a result, the coverage of China’s HSR amazingly reached 38,000 km in 2020, adding up to two-thirds 
of the total coverage of the world’s HSR. In recent times, HSR has become a popular mode of transport 
in China and is also an alternative to air travel for medium and long-distance travel. In China, HSR 
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competes with airlines providing differentiated transport services over journeys of 400–800 km.1 
Meanwhile, the regulatory reform for the HSR has progressed into a mixed economy, in which a 
state-owned HSR competes with private airlines in the passenger transportation market. In order to 
separate the functions of the government from those of enterprises, the government canceled the 
Ministry of Railways and carried out structural reforms in the railway industry in 2013.2 Consequently, 
in 2019, to operate both the HSR and ordinal railways, China Railway Corporation was established and 
became in charge of raising funds during construction and setting ticket fares during operation. However, 
the government could indirectly regulate business ethics related to the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities of the HSR firm.3That is, the HSR acts like a partially privatized firm under the 
government’s indirect control of the well-being of consumers. As the central government gradually 
liberalized price controls, both the HSR and airlines can independently set their ticket fares, considering 
the fierce competition over fares and traffic volumes in the transportation market. 
A debatable issue in the current deregulation of the HSR operator in China is whether CSR should 
be regulated, as activities of voluntary CSR are philanthropic.4 This was done considering that the HSR 
operator was previously in a mixed economy and is presently viewed as a privatized firm under the 
government imposition of CSR. As firms and the government implement new initiatives to enforce CSR 
practices, it is critical to identify the type of relationship between voluntary CSR and legislated CSR.5 
                                                   
1 For more details, see Givoni (2005), Givoni and Banister (2007), Rothengatter (2011), Fu et al. (2012), and 
Socorro and Viecens (2013).  
2 For practical discussions in the liberalization period on the privatization and structural reform policies in Asian 
countries including Japan and South Korea, see Lee (2006) and Lee et al. (2018). Boubakri et al. (2019) evaluated 
41 countries’ links between privatization and CSR from 2002 to 2014. They found that the private firm have, on 
average, higher sense of CSR than the public firm. 
3 Previous studies examined the effect of both direct government ownerships and indirect modes on privatization. 
For example, the government can indirectly control strategic decisions of privatized firms by political connections; 
see Fan et al. (2007), Boubakri et al. (2013), and Chen et al. (2018). These studies showed that connected firms 
must comply with government policies because the government provides subsidies and preferential treatments. 
(Ma and Parish 2006; Liu et al. 2011; Khan et al 2020). Therefore, the politically loyal bureaucrats appointed on 
the board of privatized firms can help the remaining state owners to make decisions on CSRs.  
4 The global perception of CSR has evolved to current trends that start routing voluntary CSR towards legal CSR. 
It is common that that firms can voluntarily choose whether to assume social responsibilities because the law did 
not specify the standards of CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Dahlsrud, 2008). However, some recent cases of 
legally compelling enterprises to fulfill their social responsibilities have questioned the view of voluntary CSR 
(Waagstein, 2011). Thus, as the government gradually formulates laws and regulations on CSR, the debate on the 
nature of CSRs continues. For example, Indonesia in 2007, Denmark in 2008, France in 2010, Philippines and 
Spain in 2011, Argentina and Brazil in 2012, India and Norway in 2013, and European Union in 2014. A completely 
revised Companies Act by the India government in 2013 marked a bold step in legalization of CSR. For more 
discussion, see Gatti et al. (2019) and Isaksson and Mitra (2019). 
5 Xu et al. (2020) examined the standard CSR and voluntary CSR in a domestic transportation market in which a 
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Therefore this paper addresses the questions of whether CSR should be voluntary or mandatory and 
whether privatization policy with CSR activities can improve social welfare under an appropriate 
government subsidy policy. 
Initial studies on the transportation services markets in which the HSR competes with airlines were 
pioneered by Janic (1993), who examined the private firm’s decisions on infrastructure investment over 
a single origin-destination link. In the domestic mixed market configuration in which the HSR is a 
partially privatized firm, Yang and Zhang (2012) examined the impact of HSR and airlines competition 
on firms’ profits and social welfare, and D’Alfonso et al. (2015, 2016) investigated the impact of the 
HSR and airline competition on the environment. In particular, they showed that when the government 
owns a higher stake in the HSR firm, competitions between two modes of transport have a negative 
effect on the environment. Considering a three origin-destination link, Jiang and Zhang (2014) analyzed 
the impact of a capacity-constrained HSR and a hub-and-spoke airline cooperation in the domestic 
market. Jiang et al. (2017) also extended the analysis of air-rail cooperation into the international market 
in which the rail operator might cooperate with either domestic or foreign airlines. Finally, Xia et al. 
(2019) examined a revenue sharing mechanism between airline and HSR with retaining its own objective 
function in an international transport market. 
However, there is limited research on strategic decisions on CSR of the HSR firm in an 
international differentiated transportation market, and the relationships between strategic CSR and 
government subsidy policy with reforms of state-owned enterprises. This paper examines a mandatory 
CSR policy enforced by law or regulation and determines the conditions under which voluntary CSR 
approach is more effective to implement and engage. 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, a theoretical model is used to discuss the two 
types of CSR imposed on the HSR with a variety of transport substitutability in an international market: 
mandatory CSR which is imposed by the government and voluntary CSR, which is chosen by the HSR 
operator. The transport substitutability is incorporated between the HSR and the airline in a domestic 
leg and also incorporated between domestic and foreign airlines in an international leg. Second, the 
relationship between types of CSR imposed on the HSR and transportation industry policy is 
                                                   
HSR engaged in CSR and a domestic airline compete in both prices and quantities with linear cost function.  
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investigated, leading to potential policy development. Particularly, the government provides 
transportation subsidies to both the HSR and domestic airline when competing with foreign airlines in 
an international differentiated market. It is necessary to carefully investigate the types of CSR imposed 
on the HSR when the government additionally provides an output subsidy to the domestic firms to 
increase their competitive advantage. Third, this paper investigates the effect of privatization policy of 
the HSR on welfare with various types of CSR activities and transport substitutability under a 
government subsidy policy in an open mixed economy. It would be beneficial to academia and industry 
to have a better understanding of the effect of privatization policy. 
Here, we consider an international transportation market in which the HSR competes with airlines 
with differentiated services under government policies and investigates a strategic relationship between 
different CSR activities and transportation subsidy policy. The main results are as follows. First, the 
optimal subsidy is increasing in transport substitutability between HSR and airline, while it is decreasing 
in transport substitutability between airlines. However, the effect of transport substitutability on strategic 
CSR depends on the types of CSR. Second, the relationship between CSR activities and transportation 
subsidy depends on transport substitutability. In particular, when the transport substitutability in the 
domestic leg is low, mandatory CSR can be higher than voluntary CSR, and the optimal subsidy under 
mandatory CSR is higher than that under voluntary CSR. The opposite results can be found when the 
transport substitutability in the domestic leg is high. Third, the full privatization of the HSR, in addition 
to CSR activities, always improves social welfare under an appropriate subsidy policy, which is 
independent of the type of CSR activities and transport substitutability. Alternatively, the effect of 
privatization policy with CSR activities on profits depends on the type of firm. It always increases the 
domestic firms' profits, while it decreases the foreign firms' profits, which is independent of the type of 
CSR activities and transport substitutability. Thus, domestic and foreign firms have different preferences 
for government regulations on state-owned HSR. Both the government and domestic firms will be better 
off if the privatization policy with CSR activities is implemented, while the foreign airline will be worse 
off. 
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is provided in Section 2, in which a HSR 
engaged in CSR activities competes with a domestic airline in a domestic leg, and the domestic airline 
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firm also competes with a foreign airline firm in an international leg. Section 3 analyses two scenarios 
in the international transportation market, namely mandatory CSR which is imposed by the government, 
and voluntary CSR which is chosen by the HSR operator. Section 4 compares the main results of the 
two scenarios and considers a comparable mixed market in which a state-owned HSR competes with 
airlines, and then examines the welfare effect of privatization of the HSR under government subsidy. 
Section 5 offers the conclusions to the paper. 
2. The model 
Suppose there is a connecting market, including a domestic leg and an international leg. Three 
firms compete in this transportation market: a domestic HSR firm, a domestic airline firm, and a foreign 
airline firm. We assume that the HSR services only the domestic leg, the foreign airline services only 
the international leg, while the domestic airline services two legs. Figure 1 represents the setting. In 
particular, N1 is a peripheral city within the country, N2 is a domestic hub used by domestic airlines as a 
gateway to the outside world. N3 represents an international hub, or a collection of such international 
hubs, with the presence of both the domestic and foreign airlines. For example: N1 represents a 
peripheral Chinese city, Dalian, N2 is Beijing, its capital, and N3 is Paris. The domestic airline firm is 
Air China, and the foreign airline firm is Air France. 
N1 N2 N3
    
  
Domestic leg International leg
 
Figure1. Network structure 
There are two origin-destination (OD) markets with the three cities: N1N2 and N2N3. As indicated 
above, the N1N2 market is a HSR-accessible market, which is operated by HSR and domestic airline. 
We denote 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 and 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 as the traffic volume of the HSR and domestic airline in market N1N2, 
respectively. The N2N3 market is a HSR-inaccessible market, which is operated by domestic and foreign 
airlines. We denote 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 and 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 as the traffic volume of the domestic and foreign airlines in market 
N2N3, respectively. Furthermore, the two modes of transport imperfectly substitute each other in the two 
legs, where 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of transport substitutability. In particular, larger values of 
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𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 represent higher substitutability or lower differentiation, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. Thus, higher substitutability 
reduces the passenger’s willingness to pay, while it improves consumer surplus. Additionally, the 
parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  represents a market size, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. For the convenience of analysis without the loss 
of generality, we assume that two markets have the same market size with the following linear inverse 
demand functions in each market: 𝑃𝑃1𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴, 𝑃𝑃1𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅, 𝑃𝑃2𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏2𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹, 𝑃𝑃2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 − 𝑏𝑏2𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴,                                                        (1) 
where 𝑃𝑃1𝑅𝑅 and 𝑃𝑃1𝐴𝐴 respect the ticket fare of the HSR and domestic airline in market N1N2, and 𝑃𝑃2𝐴𝐴 
and 𝑃𝑃2𝐹𝐹 respect the ticket fare of the domestic and foreign airline in market N2N3, respectively.  
The cost function of each operator in the two markets is identical and increasing in its total 
quantities. In particular, 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘) = 12 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘2  for a single service provider where 𝑘𝑘 = 1𝑅𝑅, 2𝐹𝐹 , while 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴) = 12 (𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴)2 for domestic airline firm, which is a double services provider. Thus, 
the domestic airline firm has both diseconomies of scale and scope. We also assume that the government 
provides a transportation subsidy 𝑠𝑠 per unit of output to the two domestic firms. The profits of the three 
firms are given by 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = (𝑃𝑃1𝑅𝑅 + 𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 − 12 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅2,                                             𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = (𝑃𝑃1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + (𝑃𝑃2𝐴𝐴 + 𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 − 12 (𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴)2,                         𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹 = 𝑃𝑃2𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 − 12 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹2.                                                         (2) 
The consumer surplus is given by6 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 12 (𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅2 + 2𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹2 + 2𝑏𝑏2𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹).                          (3) 
The social welfare is the sum of domestic industry profits and consumer surplus minus subsidy 
expenditures: 
                                                   
6 Note that the demands of the two markets are independent and thus, the consumer surplus is separable, that is, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑞𝑞i𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑞𝑞i𝑅𝑅2 + 2𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞i𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞i𝑅𝑅)/2 and 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2.  
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𝑊𝑊 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 + 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴).                                        (4) 
Regarding the objective function of the three firms, we assume that both the domestic and foreign 
airlines seek to maximize profits, while the HSR pursuits not only profitability but also CSR activities. 
Then, the objective function of the HSR is:7 𝑉𝑉 = 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,                                                              (5) 
where 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0,1] denotes the degree of CSR of the HSR. Particularly, 𝛽𝛽 = 0 means that the domestic 
HSR has no care about passengers’ well-being.  
Regarding the organizational structure of the HSR firm, we employ a managerial delegation 
framework where the owner and the operator are separated. However, the operator determines the 
optimal degree of CSR as an incentive contract.8 In particular, we consider the two scenarios where 
either the government can impose mandatory CSR or the HSR operator can impose voluntary CSR. In 
the former case, when the state-owned HSR is privatized, the board members of the HSR firm are public 
officers who care for social welfare. In the latter case, the HSR is fully privatized without government 
regulation, and the operator decides the profit-maximizing degree of CSR. Therefore, we can compare 
mandatory CSR chosen by the welfare-maximizing government and voluntary CSR, which is chosen by 
the profit-maximizing HSR operator. 
The order of the game is constructed as follows. In the first stage, the government decides the level 
of subsidy to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, taking the level of subsidy as given, either 
the government or the HSR operator chooses the degree of CSR to maximize their objectives, 
respectively. In the final stage, taking the level of subsidy and degree of CSR as given, the HSR and 
airlines compete in traffic volumes. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is solved by backward 
induction. 
                                                   
7 Note that if we consider a consumer surplus in N1N2 market that only the HSR addresses, then it takes care of a 
portion of CSR, that is, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 instead of CS. Then, we have 𝑉𝑉 = 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1. However, the analysis is the same 
because the demands of the two markets are independent and the consumer surplus is separable. 
8 From the perspective of shareholders, CSR is a business strategy which reflects the management’s incentive 
contracts. For more discussion on the delegation framework where the CSR level is chosen by the firm directly 
involved, refer studies by Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Leal et al. (2018), Kim et al. (2019), and Lee and Park 
(2019). Some works also considered other cases; for example, Liu et al. (2015) examined the strategic 
environmental CSR which is determined by NGOs, Brand and Grothe (2015) considered an upstream monopoly 
in a vertical relation, and Xu and Lee (2019) investigated mandatory CSR by a government in international trade. 
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3. The analysis 
3.1. Output competition 
In the final stage, the HSR operator chooses the traffic volume 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 to maximize the objective 
function V in Eq. (5), the domestic airline operator chooses traffic volumes 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 and 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 to maximize 
its profit 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 in Eq. (2), and the foreign airline operator chooses the traffic volume 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 to maximize 
its profit 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹 in Eq. (2), respectively. The first-order conditions are  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 − 3𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅) = 0, ∂𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴∂𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 = s + 𝛼𝛼 − 3𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 − 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 = 0,  ∂𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴∂𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 − 3𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏2𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 = 0, ∂𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹∂𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑏𝑏2𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 − 3𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 = 0.                                                   (6) 
Solving Eq. (6), the traffic volumes of the three firms are derived as 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 = 3(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(𝑏𝑏22−8)−(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏1((𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22−6(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2)(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22) ,  𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 = (𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏1(9−𝑏𝑏22)+(3−𝛽𝛽)((𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22−6(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2)(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22) , 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼(9−3𝛽𝛽−(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏2−3(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(6−2𝛽𝛽+𝑏𝑏1−(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12)(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22) , 𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹 = (𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2−2(3−𝛽𝛽)(4𝛼𝛼−(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏2)−(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12((𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏2−3𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22) .                              (7) 
Note that the effect of the transportation subsidy on traffic volumes depends on the type of firm. In 
particular, the subsidy increases the domestic firm's traffic volumes, while it decreases the foreign firm's 
traffic volumes, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 > 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 > 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 > 0, and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 < 0. Note also that the effect of the 
CSR activities of the HSR on traffic volumes depends on the type of firm and market. In particular, the 
CSR activities of the HSR increase its traffic volumes, while they decrease the competitor’s traffic 
volumes in a domestic leg, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0. However, the CSR activities of the HSR 
increase the traffic volumes of the domestic airline, while they decrease the traffic volumes of the foreign 
airline in an international leg, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0. 
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The profit of the HSR operator and social welfare are as follows9 
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = (3(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(𝑏𝑏22−8)−(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏1((𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22−6(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2))(2(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏12(𝑏𝑏22−9)−3(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(3−2𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22)−(3+𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏1((𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22−6(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2))2((1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22))2 , 
𝑊𝑊 = 8(𝛼𝛼2(765−462𝛽𝛽+53𝛽𝛽2)+18𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(17−14𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)−9𝑠𝑠2))−2(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏13𝐴𝐴1−2𝑏𝑏1𝐴𝐴2+(1−𝛽𝛽)2𝑏𝑏14(9(5𝛼𝛼2+2𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼−2𝑠𝑠2)+6(𝑠𝑠−2𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2+(𝑠𝑠2−4𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼−7𝛼𝛼2)𝑏𝑏22+2𝛼𝛼2𝑏𝑏23)+𝑏𝑏12𝐴𝐴3+2𝑏𝑏2𝐴𝐴42((1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)−3(3−𝛽𝛽)(8−𝑏𝑏22))2 .             (8) 
Next, we analyze two scenarios in the international transportation market: mandatory CSR and voluntary 
CSR. 
3.2. Mandatory CSR 
We first consider mandatory CSR as the government’s standard in which the degree of CSR, 𝛽𝛽, is 
chosen by a welfare-maximizing government in the second stage. Assuming interior solution, the 
differentiation of 𝑊𝑊 in Eq. (8) with respect to 𝛽𝛽 yields:  
𝛽𝛽 = 9(𝛼𝛼−2𝑠𝑠)�8−𝑏𝑏22�2−𝑏𝑏13(9(7𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)+3𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2−(17𝑠𝑠+2𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22+𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏24)+3𝑏𝑏1(60𝑠𝑠−84𝛼𝛼−10𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2+(25𝛼𝛼−17𝑠𝑠)𝑏𝑏22+2𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏23+(𝑠𝑠−2𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏24)+𝑏𝑏12(306𝑠𝑠+90𝛼𝛼−(71𝑠𝑠+20𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22+(4𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏24)𝐴𝐴5 .                   (9)  
Note that the subsidy decreases the level of CSR, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 < 0. The government subsidy policy and 
CSR activities are substitutes in the international transportation market under mandatory CSR.  
In the first stage, the government maximizes social welfare to decide the level of subsidy. 
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (8), we obtain the resulting social welfare. Then, the differentiation of W 
with respect to s yields the following optimal subsidy: 𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(3𝑏𝑏12(3−𝑏𝑏2)(3+2𝑏𝑏2)+𝑏𝑏1(36−11𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏24)−2(72+(1−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2(20−𝑏𝑏22)))𝐴𝐴6 ,                        (10)  
where the superscript “M” denotes the equilibrium outcome under Mandatory CSR. Note that 
0 < 𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀 < 1 . The government will always provide a transportation subsidy to domestic firms in an 
international differentiated market. Note also that the optimal subsidy is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while it is 
increasing in 𝑏𝑏2 , that is,  𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0  and 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 > 0 . When the domestic airline and HSR perfectly 
substitute in a domestic leg, the government chooses a lower level of subsidy to decrease the output-
improving effect of subsidy policy. Alternatively, when the domestic and foreign airlines are perfect 
                                                   
9
 The value of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,13 is provided in Appendix A. 
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substitutes in an international leg, the government chooses a higher subsidy to improve the competitive 
advantage of the domestic airline. Thus, the effects of transport substitutability on optimal subsidy 
depend on its extent in the domestic and foreign legs. 
Substituting Eq. (10) into Eq. (9), the strategic mandatory CSR is  𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 = 72−40𝑏𝑏2+2𝑏𝑏23−𝑏𝑏13(3−𝑏𝑏2)(3+2𝑏𝑏2)+9𝑏𝑏12(6+𝑏𝑏2−𝑏𝑏22)−𝑏𝑏1(36+(1−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2(5+𝑏𝑏2))𝐴𝐴7 .                  (11) 
The strategic mandatory CSR is partial, that is, 0 < 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 < 1. Thus, when the government provides an 
output subsidy in the first stage, it also makes the HSR participate in CSR activates. Further, the 
relationship between the strategic mandatory CSR and 𝑏𝑏1 is U-shaped, while it is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏2, 
that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 <>0 when 𝑏𝑏1 is small (large) and 𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽M𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0.10  
The resulting traffic volumes of the firms at equilibrium are 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑏𝑏1(72+𝑏𝑏2(11−𝑏𝑏2(17+(1−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)))−2(108−20𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏24))𝐴𝐴6 , 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑏𝑏12(9+(3−2𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)+𝑏𝑏1(90−17𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏24)−2(72+𝑏𝑏2(14−𝑏𝑏2(18+(1−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2))))𝐴𝐴6 , 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑏𝑏12(45−𝑏𝑏2(11+(3−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2))−18𝑏𝑏1−4(36−𝑏𝑏2(11+(3−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)))𝐴𝐴6 ,  𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(6𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2−4(3−𝑏𝑏2)(12−𝑏𝑏22)+𝑏𝑏12(39−𝑏𝑏2(15+(3−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)))𝐴𝐴6 .                       (12)  
A few remarks are in order. First, the relationship between the HSR’s traffic volume and 𝑏𝑏1 is U-shaped, 
while the HSR's traffic volume is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏2 , that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 <>0  when 𝑏𝑏1 <> 𝐴𝐴8𝐴𝐴9 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0 . 
Second, the domestic airline's traffic volume is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while it is increasing in 𝑏𝑏2 in the 
N1N2 market, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0 and  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 > 0. The opposite results could be found in the N2N3 market, 
that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 > 0 and  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0. Finally, the foreign airline's traffic volume is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 
that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. 
The profits of the firms are 
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼2(𝑏𝑏1(72+11𝑏𝑏2−17𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+𝑏𝑏24)−2(108−20𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏24))(18𝑏𝑏12(6+𝑏𝑏2−𝑏𝑏22)−504−2𝑏𝑏13(3−𝑏𝑏2)(3+2𝑏𝑏2)−2𝑏𝑏2(2−3𝑏𝑏2)(20−𝑏𝑏22)+𝑏𝑏1(144+23𝑏𝑏2−43𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+3𝑏𝑏24))2𝐴𝐴62 , 
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𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼2(4�41472−4608𝑏𝑏2−12400𝑏𝑏22+480𝑏𝑏23+1624𝑏𝑏24+16𝑏𝑏25−109𝑏𝑏26−2𝑏𝑏27+3𝑏𝑏28�+𝑏𝑏14�7128−2736𝑏𝑏2−828𝑏𝑏22+476𝑏𝑏23−9𝑏𝑏24−22𝑏𝑏25+3𝑏𝑏26�+𝐴𝐴10)2𝐴𝐴62 , 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 = 3𝛼𝛼2(6𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2−4(3−𝑏𝑏2)(12−𝑏𝑏22)+𝑏𝑏12(39−𝑏𝑏2(15+(3−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)))22𝐴𝐴62 .                           (13) 
Note that the profit of the three firms are always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , that is, ∂𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀∂𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 , 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 , and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. Thus, all three firms earn less when transport substitutability is high. In other 
words, the HSR could never be beneficial by increasing transport substitutability either in a domestic 
leg or in an international leg.  
The resulting social welfare is  𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 =  𝛼𝛼2(2𝑏𝑏2(16+47𝑏𝑏2−2𝑏𝑏22−2𝑏𝑏23)−552+𝑏𝑏12(67−16𝑏𝑏2−7𝑏𝑏22+2𝑏𝑏23)+2𝑏𝑏1(72+11𝑏𝑏2−17𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+𝑏𝑏24))2𝐴𝐴6 .      (14) 
Note that social welfare is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. Thus, society is 
worse off when the transport substitutability is high either in a domestic leg or in an international leg. 
3.3. Voluntary CSR 
The case of voluntary CSR is considered next, where 𝛽𝛽 is determined by the profit maximizing 
HSR operator in the second stage. Assuming interior solution, the differentiation of 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 in Eq. (8) with 
respect to 𝛽𝛽 yields  𝛽𝛽 = 𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)(6(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(4−𝑏𝑏1)−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏2−(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(3−𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏22)9(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)�8−𝑏𝑏22�2+𝑏𝑏1(6𝑠𝑠+6𝛼𝛼+𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2−𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏22−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏22)(48−9𝑏𝑏12−6𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏12𝑏𝑏22)−3𝑏𝑏12(𝑠𝑠+𝛼𝛼)(72−17𝑏𝑏22+𝑏𝑏24).         (15) 
Note that the subsidy increases the level of CSR, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 > 0. In other words, the government subsidy 
policy and CSR activities complement each other in the international transportation market under 
voluntary CSR, which is opposite to the result under mandatory CSR. 
Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (8), we can get social welfare. In the first stage, the differentiation of 𝑊𝑊 with respect to 𝑠𝑠 yields 
𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕 = 𝛼𝛼(81�8−𝑏𝑏2
2�2(136+20𝑏𝑏2−36𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+2𝑏𝑏24)−54𝑏𝑏1�8−𝑏𝑏22�2(84+5𝑏𝑏2−25𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+2𝑏𝑏24)+𝑏𝑏14(3−𝑏𝑏2)
(3672+2844𝑏𝑏2−552𝑏𝑏22−522𝑏𝑏23−20𝑏𝑏24+5𝑏𝑏25+4𝑏𝑏26+2𝑏𝑏27)−9𝑏𝑏12(8−𝑏𝑏22)(2880+624𝑏𝑏2−1046𝑏𝑏22−83𝑏𝑏23+109𝑏𝑏24+𝑏𝑏25−3𝑏𝑏26)+3𝑏𝑏13(8−𝑏𝑏22)(2808+162𝑏𝑏2−1164𝑏𝑏22−53𝑏𝑏23+166𝑏𝑏24+4𝑏𝑏25−8𝑏𝑏26))𝐴𝐴11 ,       (16) 
where the subscript “V” denotes the equilibrium outcome under Voluntary CSR. Note that 0 < 𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕 < 1. 
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Thus, the government will always provide a transportation subsidy to domestic firms in an international 
differentiated market under mandatory CSR. Note also that the optimal subsidy is increasing in 𝑏𝑏1, 
while it is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏2, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 > 0.  
Substituting Eq. (16) into Eq. (15), the strategic voluntary CSR is 
𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕 = (𝑏𝑏12(9−𝑏𝑏22)(𝑏𝑏13(1080+222𝑏𝑏2−360𝑏𝑏22−35𝑏𝑏23+36𝑏𝑏24+𝑏𝑏25−𝑏𝑏26)−𝑏𝑏12(2592+84𝑏𝑏2−468𝑏𝑏22+31𝑏𝑏23−6𝑏𝑏24−5𝑏𝑏25+3𝑏𝑏26)+9(8−𝑏𝑏22)(480+20𝑏𝑏2−108𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23+6𝑏𝑏24)−3𝑏𝑏1(8−𝑏𝑏22)(648+68𝑏𝑏2−180𝑏𝑏22−7𝑏𝑏23+12𝑏𝑏24))𝐴𝐴12 .     (17) 
The strategic voluntary CSR is partial, that is, 0 < 𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕 < 1. Thus, when the government provides an 
output subsidy in the first stage, the HSR with voluntary CSR will always decides to participate in CSR. 
In addition, voluntary CSR is increasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while the relationship between voluntary CSR and 𝑏𝑏2 
is inversely U-shaped, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 > 0  and  𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 ><0  when 𝑏𝑏1  is small (large). A higher level of 
substitutability between the HSR and domestic airline yields a fiercer market competition in the 
domestic leg. Additionally, the HSR chooses a higher voluntary CSR to serve more passengers under 
quantity competition. Alternatively, the effect of 𝑏𝑏2 on optimal voluntary CSR depends on 𝑏𝑏1. When 
the market competition in the domestic leg is less fierce, an increase in substitutability between airlines 
increases the optimal level of voluntary CSR, otherwise, the opposite results are found. 
Next, we consider the equilibrium traffic volumes, profits, and welfare under voluntary CSR. First, 
the relationship between the HSR’s traffic volume and 𝑏𝑏1 is U-shaped, while the relationship between 
the HSR's traffic volume and 𝑏𝑏2 is inversely U-shaped, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 <> 0  and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 >< 0 . Second, the 
domestic airline's traffic volume in N1N2 market is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while it is increasing in 𝑏𝑏2, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0 and  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 > 0. The opposite results are found when the domestic airline competes with the 
foreign airline in N2N3 market, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 > 0 and  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0 . Third, the foreign airline's traffic 
volume is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. 
Further, the HSR's profit is decreasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while the relationship between the HSR's profit and 𝑏𝑏2 is inversely U-shaped, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 ><0. Alternatively, the airlines' profits are always 
decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2 . Finally, social welfare is always 
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decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. 
4. Comparison and discussion 
4.1. Comparison 
Proposition 1: Under transportation subsidy, mandatory CSR is higher (lower) than voluntary CSR 
when the transport substitutability in the domestic leg is low (high). 
Proof: Comparing the optimal degrees of the CSR in Eqs. (11) and (17) in the two scenarios,11 we have 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 ><𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕, depending on whether 𝑏𝑏1 is small or large.  
Proposition 1 states that the transport substitutability is critical to the relationship between 
mandatory CSR and voluntary CSR when the government provides a subsidy to domestic firms. On the 
one hand, voluntary CSR is lower than mandatory CSR when the transport competition is fierce in the 
domestic leg. That is, the HSR operator will choose a lower voluntary CSR when the transport 
substitutability between HSR and airline is low. On the other hand, higher transport substitutability 
makes the HSR operator voluntarily delegate higher CSR to managers to expand productions, thereby 
resulting in over-production in the market, and thus urging the government to enforce a lower level of 
mandatory CSR.  
Proposition 2: The optimal subsidy under mandatory CSR is lower (higher) than that under voluntary 
CSR when the transport substitutability in a domestic leg is low (high). 
Proof: Comparing the optimal levels of the subsidy in Eqs. (10) and (16) in the two scenarios, we have 𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀 <> 𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕, depending on whether 𝑏𝑏1 is small or large.  
Proposition 2 states that mandatory CSR should be accompanied by a lower subsidy than voluntary 
CSR when the transport competition is fierce in a domestic leg. This is because mandatory CSR is a 
firm-specific regulation while output subsidy is an industry-wide regulation for the domestic firms. 
                                                   
11
 Numerical comparisons of the main results in the two models are provided in Figure 5 in Appendix B. 
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From proposition 1, when the competition between HSR and airline is fierce in the domestic leg, 
mandatory CSR can be lower than voluntary CSR, which might decrease total market production. Thus, 
the government should increase the level of subsidy to domestic firms. That is, the government increases 
the product-improving effect of the subsidy policy when it could simultaneously choose the mandatory 
CSR. However, when the transport competition between HSR and airline is less fierce, the government 
will provide a lower subsidy to domestic firms. In comparison, it imposes a higher mandatory CSR on 
the HSR. 
Proposition 3: Mandatory CSR might yield lower profits for the domestic firms and higher profits for 
the foreign firm than voluntary CSR, and mandatory CSR always yields higher social welfare than 
voluntary CSR. 
Proof: Comparing the equilibrium profits of the firm and social welfares in the two scenarios, we have 
(i) 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 <>𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕, 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 <>𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕, and 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 ><𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕, depending on 𝑏𝑏1 whether it is small or large; (ii) 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀＞𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕.  
Proposition 3 states that the effect of voluntary CSR on profits depends on the type of firm when 
the government provides a transportation subsidy to domestic firms. Particularly, domestic firms are 
better off with voluntary CSR in an extensive range. At the same time, they are worse off with voluntary 
CSR only when the transport substitutability is extremely high in both the domestic and foreign legs. 
The opposite results could be found for the foreign firm. Proposition 3 also states that social welfare 
under mandatory CSR is higher than voluntary CSR when the government provides a transportation 
subsidy. The society is better off with mandatory CSR. Thus, the local government and domestic firms 
may have different preferences on CSR under transportation subsidy. The local government prefers 
mandatory CSR. In contrast, both HSR and airline firms prefer voluntary CSR.  
4.2. The welfare effect of privatization policy 
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We consider a mixed transportation market situation in which a state-owned HSR competes with 
two profit-maximizing airlines. Note that the government fully owns the HSR, and it seeks welfare-
maximization when engaging in CSR activities nor providing an output subsidy, that is, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝑠𝑠 = 0. 
In the final stage, the government decides the traffic volume 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 to maximize social welfare in 
Eq. (4). The first-order condition is 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 − 2𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 − 3𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅 = 0.                                  (18) 
Solving Eq. (6) and Eq. (18), the traffic volumes of the three firms are derived as 𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(24−3𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏1(3−𝑏𝑏2)(2+𝑏𝑏2))48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 , 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑏𝑏2−3)(𝑏𝑏1(3+𝑏𝑏2)−2(2+𝑏𝑏2))48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 , 
q2𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑏𝑏1(3−𝑏𝑏1(3−𝑏𝑏2))+6(2−𝑏𝑏2))48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 , 
q2𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(16−3𝑏𝑏12−(4+(1−𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏2)48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 .                                               (19) 
where the subscript “B” denotes the equilibrium outcome in a Benchmark case for privatization policy. 
First, the relationship between the HSR's traffic volume and 𝑏𝑏1 is U-shaped, while the HSR's traffic 
volume is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏2, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 <>0 when 𝑏𝑏1 <>𝐴𝐴13 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0. Second, when the 
domestic airline competes with the HSR in the N1N2 market, the domestic airline's traffic volume is 
decreasing in 𝑏𝑏1, while it is increasing in 𝑏𝑏2, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 > 0. The opposite results are 
found when the domestic airline competes with the foreign airline in the N2N3 market, that is, 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 > 0 
and  
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0. Finally, the foreign airline's traffic volume is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0. 
The ticket fares of the firms are respectively: 𝑃𝑃1𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(24−3𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏1(3−𝑏𝑏2)(2+𝑏𝑏2))48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 , 𝑃𝑃1𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(3(12−𝑏𝑏1(5+𝑏𝑏1))−(2−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏2−2(2−𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏22)48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 , 𝑃𝑃2𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼(2𝑏𝑏12(𝑏𝑏2−3)+𝑏𝑏1(𝑏𝑏22−3)+2(18−𝑏𝑏2(5+𝑏𝑏2)))48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 ,  𝑃𝑃2𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 = 2𝛼𝛼(16−3𝑏𝑏12−(4+(1−𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏1)𝑏𝑏2)48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22 .                                                (20) 
Thus, the profits of the firms are, respectively: 
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𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼2(3𝑏𝑏14(3−𝑏𝑏2)2−2𝑏𝑏13(3−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏22−12𝑏𝑏1�48+𝑏𝑏2�8−16𝑏𝑏2+𝑏𝑏23��+12(96−𝑏𝑏2(32+8𝑏𝑏2−𝑏𝑏23))+𝑏𝑏12(𝑏𝑏2(192−𝑏𝑏2(68+𝑏𝑏2(4−3𝑏𝑏2)))−72))2(48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22)2 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼2(𝑏𝑏1(6+𝑏𝑏2−𝑏𝑏22)−3(8−𝑏𝑏22))22(48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22)2 , 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 = 3𝛼𝛼2(3𝑏𝑏12+(4+𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏2−16)22(48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22)2 .                                                (21) 
Note that the relationship between the HSR's profit and 𝑏𝑏1 is U-shaped, while the HSR's profit is 
always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏2, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏1 <>0 when 𝑏𝑏1 <>𝐴𝐴13 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 < 0. Additionally, the domestic and 
foreign airlines' profits are decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0. 
Finally, the social welfare is: 
𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼2(2848+𝑏𝑏14(3−𝑏𝑏2)2(5+2𝑏𝑏2)+2𝑏𝑏13(3−𝑏𝑏2)(15+𝑏𝑏2(7−𝑏𝑏2(2+𝑏𝑏2)))−2𝑏𝑏2(112+𝑏𝑏2(332−𝑏𝑏2(20+17𝑏𝑏2)))−4𝑏𝑏1(180+𝑏𝑏2(26−𝑏𝑏2(53+4(1−𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2)))+𝑏𝑏12(𝑏𝑏2(116+𝑏𝑏2(129−4𝑏𝑏2(5+𝑏𝑏2)))−654))2(48−9𝑏𝑏12−(6−𝑏𝑏12)𝑏𝑏22)2 .        (22) 
Note that social welfare is always decreasing in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0. 
Proposition 4: Comparing the three firms’ profits and social welfare in the three models, we have the 
following relationships: 
(i) 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀{𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕,𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀} > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵, Min{𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕,𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀} > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, and 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀{𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀,𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕};   
(ii) 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀＞𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕 > 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵. 
Proof: Comparing the three firms' profits and social welfares in the three models,12 we have (i) 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 >𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵, 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕 > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵, 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, but 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵, 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕 < 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵; (ii) 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀＞𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕 > 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵.  
Proposition 4 states that full privatization of the HSR with CSR activities always increases the 
domestic firms' profits, that is, 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕 > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 , 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 , and 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕 > 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 , while it 
decreases the foreign firm’ profit, that is, 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 and 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕 < 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵. That is, domestic and foreign 
firms have different preferences for the government regulations on the state-owned enterprise. The 
domestic firm will be better off if the privatization policy with CSR activities is implemented while the 
foreign airline will be worse off. Proposition 4 also states independent of the transport substitutability 
and types of CSR, full privatization with CSR activities always improves social welfare, that is, 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 >
                                                   
12
 Numerical comparisons of the main results in the two models are provided in Figure 6 in Appendix B. 
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𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 and 𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕 > 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵. Full privatization with mandatory CSR yields the highest social welfare, while 
full nationalization yields the lowest social welfare. Thus, a full privatization policy with CSR activities 
always improves social welfare, which is independent of types of CSR activities. It also states that the 
privatization of HSR in an international transportation market requires an appropriate subsidy policy 
under the well-managed CSR regulations. 
5. Conclusion 
We consider an international transportation market in which an HSR firm competes with airline 
firms with differentiated services under government policies, and investigate a strategic relationship 
between CSR activities and transportation subsidy policy. We compare mandatory CSR and voluntary 
CSR as two scenarios, and show that the transport substitutability in the two legs is critical to the 
relationship between subsidy policy and CSR activities. In particular, when the transport substitutability 
between the HSR and the airline is low, mandatory CSR can be higher than voluntary CSR, and the 
optimal subsidy under mandatory CSR is higher than that under voluntary CSR. The opposite results 
are found when the transport substitutability between the HSR and airline is high. Finally, we investigate 
the impact of the privatization of the HSR firm on welfare and show that full privatization with CSR 
activities always improves social welfare under the appropriate subsidy policy, independent of the type 
of CSR activities and transport substitutability. 
The findings of this paper are helpful to provide an important basis for the government to formulate 
supporting polices and promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises in the transportation industry. 
It can also enforce the legislated CSR in an era ex-post privatization where the CSR initiative of the 
HSR firm has become an important policy issue for society. We propose that rather than allowing the 
HSR firm to adopt voluntary CSR, there should be active legislation toward under-incentivizing of CSR 
or progressive guideline for discouraging over-incentivizing of CSR, by taking transport substitutability 
into policy consideration. Therefore, an ambitious regulatory framework of legal CSR with the 
appropriate subsidy policy is required for the HSR firm to promote social welfare in the international 
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Appendix A. The value of 𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊 
𝐴𝐴1 = 9(𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼)�7𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼(6𝛽𝛽 − 5)� + 3𝛼𝛼�𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼(3𝛽𝛽 − 2)�𝑏𝑏2 − (𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼)�17𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼(15𝛽𝛽 − 13)�𝑏𝑏22 + 𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏23 + (𝑠𝑠 +𝛼𝛼)(𝑠𝑠 − 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽))𝑏𝑏24， 𝐴𝐴2 = 36(𝑠𝑠2(7𝛽𝛽 − 5) + 2𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(7 − 3𝛽𝛽 + 2𝛽𝛽2) + 𝛼𝛼2(19− 13𝛽𝛽 + 4𝛽𝛽2)) + 2𝛼𝛼(𝑠𝑠(15 + 11𝛽𝛽) + 𝛼𝛼(51 − 37𝛽𝛽 +
12𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏2 − (𝑠𝑠2(73𝛽𝛽 − 51) + 2𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(75 − 32𝛽𝛽 + 21𝛽𝛽2) + 𝛼𝛼2(201− 137𝛽𝛽 + 42𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏22 − 𝛼𝛼(2𝑠𝑠(3 + 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛼𝛼(15 − 10𝛽𝛽 +
3𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏23 + (𝑠𝑠2(5𝛽𝛽 − 3) + 𝛼𝛼2(15 − 10𝛽𝛽 + 3𝛽𝛽2) + 𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(12 − 5𝛽𝛽 + 3𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏24, 𝐴𝐴3 = 6(𝛼𝛼2(248𝛽𝛽 − 50𝛽𝛽2 − 147) + 6𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(1 + 20𝛽𝛽 − 4𝛽𝛽2) + 3𝑠𝑠2(43 − 32𝛽𝛽 + 6𝛽𝛽2)) − 2𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝑠𝑠(33 − 19𝛽𝛽) −𝛼𝛼(93 − 23𝛽𝛽))𝑏𝑏2 + (𝑠𝑠2(88𝛽𝛽 − 10𝛽𝛽2 − 149) + 2𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(20𝛽𝛽2 − 8 − 83𝛽𝛽) + 𝛼𝛼2(167− 298𝛽𝛽 + 60𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏22 − 2𝛼𝛼(1 −𝛽𝛽)(4𝛼𝛼(4 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝑠𝑠(1 + 𝛽𝛽))𝑏𝑏23 − 2(−2𝑠𝑠2(2 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛼𝛼2(2 − 5𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽2) + 𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽2 − 2 − 3𝛽𝛽))𝑏𝑏24, 𝐴𝐴4 = 4(5𝑠𝑠 − 7𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼(3 − 𝛽𝛽)2 + (𝛼𝛼2(−711 + 426𝛽𝛽 − 47𝛽𝛽2) − 4𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(81− 66𝛽𝛽 + 5𝛽𝛽2) + 4𝑠𝑠2(81− 30𝛽𝛽 + 5𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏2 −
(𝑠𝑠 − 5𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼(−3 + 𝛽𝛽)2𝑏𝑏22 + (𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼(18 − 15𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽2) − 𝑠𝑠2(18 − 6𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽2) + 𝛼𝛼2(36 − 21𝛽𝛽 + 2𝛽𝛽2))𝑏𝑏23, 𝐴𝐴5 = 9𝛼𝛼(8 − 𝑏𝑏22)2 − 3𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏12(72 − 17𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24) − 𝑏𝑏13(9(7𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼) + 3𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 − (17𝑠𝑠 + 2𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏24) + 𝑏𝑏1(36(7𝑠𝑠 + 3𝛼𝛼) +
22𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 − (73𝑠𝑠 + 31𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏22 − 2𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏23 + (5𝑠𝑠 + 2𝛼𝛼)𝑏𝑏24), 𝐴𝐴6 = 80𝑏𝑏22 − 4𝑏𝑏24 + 𝑏𝑏12(117− 20𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24) − 432, 𝐴𝐴7 = 216− 𝑏𝑏13(3 − 𝑏𝑏2)(3 + 2𝑏𝑏2) − 2𝑏𝑏22(20 − 𝑏𝑏22) − 𝑏𝑏12(90− 17𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24) + 𝑏𝑏1(72 + 𝑏𝑏2(17 − 𝑏𝑏2(19 + (1 −𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2))), 𝐴𝐴8 = 2(12636 + 𝑏𝑏22(−20 + 𝑏𝑏22)(225 − 20𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24)− √((108 − 20𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24)(117 − 20𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24)(7452 + 𝑏𝑏2(−1584 +𝑏𝑏2(−2173 + 𝑏𝑏2(518 + 𝑏𝑏2(214 + 𝑏𝑏2(−56 + 𝑏𝑏2(−7 + 2𝑏𝑏2)))))))))),  𝐴𝐴9 = (117 − 20𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24)(72 + 𝑏𝑏2(11− 𝑏𝑏2(17 + (1 − 𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2))), 𝐴𝐴10 = 2𝑏𝑏13(3888 + 360𝑏𝑏2 − 1836𝑏𝑏22 + 70𝑏𝑏23 + 225𝑏𝑏24 − 19𝑏𝑏25 − 9𝑏𝑏26 + 𝑏𝑏27) − 4𝑏𝑏1(20736 + 2736𝑏𝑏2 − 9648𝑏𝑏22 −
520𝑏𝑏23 + 1560𝑏𝑏24 + 37𝑏𝑏25 − 111𝑏𝑏26 − 𝑏𝑏27 + 3𝑏𝑏28) − 𝑏𝑏12(40176− 17856𝑏𝑏2 − 3304𝑏𝑏22 + 3344𝑏𝑏23 − 611𝑏𝑏24 − 204𝑏𝑏25 +
86𝑏𝑏26 + 4𝑏𝑏27 − 3𝑏𝑏28), 𝐴𝐴11 = (324(8− 𝑏𝑏22)2(86 − 18𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24) − 54𝑏𝑏1(8 − 𝑏𝑏22)2(60− 17𝑏𝑏22 + 𝑏𝑏24) − 6𝑏𝑏13(8 − 𝑏𝑏22)(1188 − 462𝑏𝑏22 +
55𝑏𝑏24 − 2𝑏𝑏26) + 9𝑏𝑏12(8 − 𝑏𝑏22)(10080 − 3118𝑏𝑏22 + 329𝑏𝑏24 − 12𝑏𝑏26) + 𝑏𝑏14(66744− 26820𝑏𝑏22 + 4110𝑏𝑏24 − 289𝑏𝑏26 + 8𝑏𝑏28)),  𝐴𝐴12 = (18𝑏𝑏1(8 − 𝑏𝑏22)2(216 + 𝑏𝑏2(53 + 𝑏𝑏2(−54 + 𝑏𝑏2(−4 + 3𝑏𝑏2)))) + 27(8− 𝑏𝑏22)2(480 + 𝑏𝑏2(20 + 𝑏𝑏2(−108 +𝑏𝑏2(−1 + 6𝑏𝑏2)))) + 𝑏𝑏15(−3 + 𝑏𝑏2)(3 + 𝑏𝑏2)(−1080 + 𝑏𝑏2(−222 + 𝑏𝑏2(360 + 𝑏𝑏2(35 + 𝑏𝑏2(−36 + (−1 + 𝑏𝑏2)𝑏𝑏2))))) −
3𝑏𝑏13(−8 + 𝑏𝑏22)(−2808 + 𝑏𝑏2(−894 + 𝑏𝑏2(900 + 𝑏𝑏2(148 + 𝑏𝑏2(−84 + 𝑏𝑏2(−5 + 2𝑏𝑏2)))))) + 3𝑏𝑏14(−8 + 𝑏𝑏22)(−2268 +𝑏𝑏2(−171 + 𝑏𝑏2(738 + 𝑏𝑏2(29 + 𝑏𝑏2(−81 + 𝑏𝑏2(−1 + 3𝑏𝑏2)))))) − 3𝑏𝑏12(−8 + 𝑏𝑏22)(−20736 + 𝑏𝑏2(−1164 + 𝑏𝑏2(7200 +𝑏𝑏2(224 + 𝑏𝑏2(−840 + 𝑏𝑏2(−10 + 33𝑏𝑏2))))))), 
𝐴𝐴13 = 72+24𝑏𝑏2−9𝑏𝑏22+3𝑏𝑏23−�3(1152+576𝑏𝑏2−248𝑏𝑏22−152𝑏𝑏23+5𝑏𝑏24+10𝑏𝑏25+𝑏𝑏26)
18+9𝑏𝑏2−2𝑏𝑏22−𝑏𝑏23 . 
 
